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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the gap between privacy and design in the context of “lateral privacy”—
privacy issues arising among users of a service rather than from the service provider—on social 
networking sites (SNSs) and other platforms by analyzing the privacy concerns lodged against the 
introduction of Facebook’s News Feed in 2006. Our analysis reveals that the dominant theory of 
privacy put forth by regulators, privacy as individual control, offers little insight into the 
experiences of privacy violation claimed by users. More importantly, we show that this theory is ill-
equipped to guide the design of SNSs and platforms to avoid similar harms in the future. A rising 
tide of privacy blunders on social networking sites and platforms drives the search for new 
regulatory approaches, and privacy regulators across the globe are increasingly demanding that the 
Fair Information Practice Principles, the embodiment of privacy as individual control, inform the 
design of technical systems through Privacy By Design. The call for Privacy By Design—the 
practice of embedding privacy protections into products and services at the design phase, rather 
than after the fact—connects to growing policymaker recognition of the power of technology to not 
only implement, but also to settle policy through architecture, configuration, interfaces, and 
default settings. We argue that regulators would do well to ensure that the concept of privacy they 
direct companies to embed affords the desirable forms of protection for privacy.  
Ideally, there would be a widely used set of methods and tools to aid in translating privacy into 
design. Today, neither is true. We identify three gaps in the “informational self-determination” 
approach that limit its responsiveness to lateral privacy design decisions in SNSs and platforms 
and then explore three alternative theories of privacy that provide compelling explanations of the 
privacy harms exemplified in platform environments. Based on this descriptive utility, we argue 
that these theories provide more robust grounding for efforts by SNSs and platform developers to 
address lateral privacy concerns in the design of technical artifacts. Unlike FIPPs, which can be 
applied across contexts, these theories require privacy to be discovered, not just implemented. To 
bridge this discovery gap, we turn to the field of Human Computer Interaction (“HCI”) and dip 
into the related field of Value Sensitive Design (“VSD”) to identify tools and methodologies that 
would aid designers in discovering and ultimately embedding these contextual, socially- oriented 
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understandings of privacy in technical artifacts. Finally, we provide some tentative thoughts on 
the form and substance of regulations that would prompt corporations to invest in these HCI 
approaches to privacy. 
INTRODUCTION 
For over thirty years the public and private sectors have been di-
rected to protect privacy through adherence to Fair Information 
Practice Principles (“FIPPs”).  Regional directives,1 international in-
struments,2 omnibus3 and sectoral laws,4 and guidance documents5 
 
 1 See, e.g., Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 33 (EC); ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. 
COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2005), available at http://publications.apec.
org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=390 . 
 2 See Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, Council of Europe, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. 108, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/108.htm; OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & 
DEV. (Sept. 23, 1980), http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_
1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 3 See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), S.C. 2000, 
c. 5 (Can.); Loi 1978-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux li-
bertés modifiée [Law 1978-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files 
and Civil Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 1978; Legge 31 dicembre 1996, n.675 (It.), available at 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=28335; Decreto Legislativo 30 June 
2003, n.196 (It.), available at http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/docu-ment?ID=
1219452 (implementing Directive 95/46/EC and the Data Protection Code). 
 4 While the U.S. has continued to take a largely sectoral approach to privacy, it has enacted 
statutes to advance FIPPs.  See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”), 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 3401–22 (2006) (protecting the confidentiality of personal financial records by creat-
ing a statutory Fourth Amendment protection for bank records); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6827 (2006) (empowering various agencies to promulgate 
data security regulations for financial institutions); Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2511 (2006) (extending restrictions against 
wiretaps to include transmissions of electronic data by computer); Video Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1988 (“VPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (preventing disclosure of personally 
identifiable rental records of “prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual ma-
terial”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. 
No. 104–91, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.) (regulating the use and disclosure of “Protected Health Information” in the sec-
tion 1173 under “Security Standards for Health Information” Section 2). 
 5 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE:  FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 36–37 (2000) (suggesting that all consumer-oriented, person-
al websites that collect personal information must comply with the four widely-accepted 
fair information principles), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/
privacy2000.pdf; Memorandum from Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., on The Fair Information Practice Principles:  Framework for Privacy Pol-
icy at the Department of Homeland Security 1 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf (“This 
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across the globe are fashioned on these principles.  Until recently, 
adherence to FIPPs-based policies through incorporation into institu-
tional policies and processes was viewed as largely sufficient to ad-
dress privacy concerns arising from private sector data collection. 
While the FIPPs model of privacy protection, and the theory of 
“informational self-determination”6 on which it rests, continues to re-
sonate with the privacy challenges in many sectors of the economy, 
regulators across the globe have begun to demand more of corpora-
tions, particularly corporations in the information and communica-
tion technology sectors. 
The increasing importance of social networking sites (“SNSs”) and 
platforms for a wide range of social interaction, such as communica-
tion and interaction between individuals and groups, is challenging 
this model of privacy protection.  A rising tide of privacy blunders on 
social networking sites and platforms drives the search for new regu-
latory approaches.  Many of these privacy gaffes center on the inte-
ractions between users.  Frequently it is the information flows 
enabled by the novel technical designs of SNSs—the technical affor-
dances or withholdings—that draw the strongest privacy objections, 
not the direct use of personal information by the firm itself. 
These plastic, sui generis, built environments give the companies 
that design them a privileged role in society.  As architects of the 
“playing fields”7 upon which individuals, and increasingly govern-
ments and private sector entities, engage, they can erect, alter, and 
obliterate structural barriers8 that afford or erode privacy through 
transaction costs.  They can introduce novel information flows.  They 
can enforce contractual terms with such global impact that they dwarf 
 
Memorandum memorializes the Fair Information Practice Principals (“FIPPs”) as the 
foundational principles for privacy policy and implementation at the Department of Ho-
meland Security.”). 
6  The term “information self-determination” was set forth in a German court decision limit-
ing the intrusiveness of the German Census Act of 1983.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfGE][Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 1 BVR 209/83 (Ger.), translated 
in 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 94, 97 (1984). 
 7 David Clark et al., Tussle in Cyberspace:  Defining Tomorrow’s Internet, 13 IEEE/ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 462, 464 (2005) (“[T]echnologists are, in fact, creating 
playing fields for the tussles of society to play out in.”). 
 8 See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1607 (2007) (“Struc-
tural constraints are regulators of behavior that prevent conduct through technological 
or physical barriers in the world.  These barriers make certain conduct costly.”). 
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national policy preferences.9  Simply put, they have an unprecedent-
ed ability to reshape privacy norms on a global scale. 
With so much at stake, regulators are reluctant to permit compa-
nies to exercise unfettered discretion over the construction of these 
new playing fields.  Growing recognition that companies hold great 
sway over the related values of privacy, publicity, and identity is 
matched by increased desire to influence firms’ architectural and pol-
icy choices.  If “[t]echnology is society made durable,”10 then society 
has a stake in the information flows11 that technical designs both pri-
vilege and prevent.  Regulatory focus is slowly shifting toward the de-
sign of the systems, not just the policies that govern them. 
Privacy regulators across the globe are increasingly demanding 
that FIPPs inform the design of technical systems.  In the past, FIPPs 
have largely been discharged through the adoption of policies and 
processes within the firm:  privacy has been the bailiwick of lawyers.  
Now, under the rubric of “privacy by design,” policymakers are calling 
on the private sector to use the distinct attributes of code to harden 
privacy’s protection.12  The call for privacy by design—the practice of 
embedding privacy protections into products and services at the de-
sign phase, rather than after the fact—connects to growing policy-
maker recognition of the power of technology to not only imple-
ment, but also to settle policy through architecture, configuration, 
interfaces, and default settings. 
Exhorting companies to embed privacy into the design of their 
SNSs and platforms is all well and good, but before doing so regula-
tors would do well to ensure that the concept of privacy they direct 
companies to embed will afford the desirable forms of protection for 
privacy.  Ideally, there would be a widely used set of methods and 
tools to aid in translating privacy into design.  Today, we argue, nei-
ther is true. 
 
 9 For example, while national policies range with respect to the desirable level of connec-
tion between online activities and identity, Facebook’s real name policy may reduce the 
practical salience of these national policies. 
 10 Bruno Latour, Technology Is Society Made Durable, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS:  ESSAYS ON 
POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION 103 (John Law ed., 1991). 
 11 See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138–39, 155 
(2004) (stating that “information appropriateness and distribution” norms derived from 
history, culture, law, and practice define privacy in specific social contexts and “govern 
key aspects such as roles, expectations, behaviors, and limits . . . .”). 
 12 Ira S. Rubenstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, BERKELEY TECH. L. J. (forthcoming) availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1837862. 
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This article explores the gap between privacy and design in the 
context of “lateral privacy”13 issues on SNSs and other platforms.  Our 
analysis reveals that the dominant theory of privacy put forth by regu-
lators—privacy as individual control—offers little insight into the ex-
periences of privacy violation claimed by Facebook users.  More im-
portantly, we show that this theory is ill-equipped to guide the design 
of SNSs and platforms to avoid similar harms in the future.  While 
FIPPs remains quite powerful and relevant to the privacy issues aris-
ing between users and Facebook—what we will refer to as the vertical 
relationship—they prove less helpful in considering the decisions Fa-
cebook makes that influence data flows among Facebook users—hat 
we call lateral privacy issues.14 
We begin with a description and analysis of privacy concerns 
lodged against Facebook’s News Feed.  In order to identify salient 
privacy issues raised by the News Feed, we explore the limits of poli-
cies and tools that foster user control over the use and disclosure of 
their personal information (“informational self-determination”).  We 
identify three gaps in the “informational self-determination” ap-
proach that limit its responsiveness to lateral privacy design decisions 
in SNSs and platforms:  inattention to technology as a regulator; ex-
clusive focus on individuals as data subjects; and related focus on the 
protection of the acontextual individual as the justification for priva-
cy.  We then explore three alternative theories of privacy that provide 
compelling explanations of the harms flowing from the introduction 
of News Feeds.  Based on this descriptive utility, we argue that these 
theories provide more robust grounding for efforts by SNSs and plat-
form developers to address lateral privacy concerns in the design of 
technical artifacts.  However, unlike FIPPs, which has been applied 
across contexts, these theories require privacy to be discovered in 
specific contexts prior to its implementation.  To bridge this discov-
ery gap, we turn to the field of Human Computer Interaction 
(“HCI”) and dip into the related field of Value Sensitive Design 
(“VSD”) to identify tools and methodologies that would aid designers 
in discovering and ultimately embedding these contextual, socially-
oriented understandings of privacy in technical artifacts.  Finally, we 
 
 13 In this paper, lateral privacy is defined as privacy issues arising among other users of a 
service, rather than from the service provider.  This term was chosen to parallel the con-
cept of coveillance or lateral surveillance.  See, e.g., Mark Andrejevic, The Work of Watching 
One Another:  Lateral Surveillance, Risk, and Governance, 2 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 479 
(2005), available at http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles2(4)/lateral.pdf. 
 14 James Grimmelmann refers to these as “peer-produced” privacy problems.  See James 
Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1188 (2009). 
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provide some tentative thoughts on the form and substance of regula-
tions that would prompt corporations to invest in these HCI ap-
proaches to privacy. 
I.  PRIVACY VIOLATIONS IN SOCIAL NETWORK SITES AND PLATFORMS 
SNSs such as Facebook and MySpace support information sharing 
between and among their individual users.  Unlike previous commu-
nication platforms, SNSs intentionally expose vast amounts of data 
about their users and their users’ interactions and transactions.  The 
exposure of such data is their defining feature.  As boyd and Ellison 
state, social networks are “web-based services that allow individuals to 
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded sys-
tem, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a con-
nection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those 
made by others within the system.”15  SNSs are used not just to com-
municate, but to construct, explicate, and perform identity through 
the articulation of connections, thoughts, and acts. 
These SNSs and platforms support an incredible variety of social 
interactions:  collaborative games; membership-based groups of every 
kind (from alumni groups to celebrity fans); political organizing, and 
information seeking and sharing, to name only a few.16  Some of these 
interactions are directly facilitated by the SNSs or platforms, while 
others are supported by platform-specific third party software.  Third 
party applications expand the functionality of SNSs and platforms, 
but they also allow developers and businesses to access a vast amount 
of user data.  Through a varied mix of technical design, policy set-
ting, application vetting, and policing, these SNSs and platform oper-
ators attempt to control how personal information flows within, into, 
and out of their platforms.17 
 
 15 danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites:  Definition, History, and Scholarship, 
13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/
boyd.ellison.html. 
 16 However, survey findings from the Pew Research Center note that the primary reasons 
people use social media are to stay in touch with family members and existing friends.  See 
Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media.aspx (reporting 
on the results of a survey finding that adult users of social network sites “say that connec-
tions with family members and friends . . . are a primary consideration in their adoption 
of social media tools . . . .”). 
 17 Various companies allow third party developers to access their platforms.  See The Develop-
er’s Guide, ANDROID, http://developer.android.com/guide/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2012); Facebook Developers, FACEBOOK, http://developers.facebook.com/ (last visited Feb. 
2, 2012); iOS Dev Center, APPLE, http://developer.apple.com/devcenter/ios/index.action 
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Increasingly, these companies are called to task for the privacy 
outcomes among participants enabled by their architectural and pol-
icy choices.  While not unprecedented,18 this environment presents a 
complex set of shifting challenges for companies, users, and policy-
makers concerned with privacy.  For while companies are clearly re-
sponsible for ensuring their own practices for handling personal in-
formation adhere to Fair Information Practice principles reflected in 
data protection and privacy laws, it is less clear what those principles 
have to say about the information flows they architect among their 
users. 
1. The Facebook News Feed 
As of 2011, Facebook is the world’s largest online social network,19 
with over 800 million users.20  A core feature of the site is the user’s 
ability to update a “status:”  a short blurb about the user’s thoughts or 
actions.  Prior to 2006, these updates appeared only on members’ 
profile pages and in an aggregated format called the “Mini Feed.”21  
Status updates were available on a user’s profile page to individuals 
on their friends list and in the user’s networks.  To view them, a 
friend of the user had to actively search out the user’s profile page. 
In 2006, Facebook introduced the News Feed.22  News Feed trans-
mitted status updates directly to the profile pages of the user’s friends 
 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2012); MySpace Developer Center, MYSPACE, http://developer. 
myspace.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012); Windows Mobile Developer Center, MICROSOFT, 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsmobile/bb264318 (last visited Feb. 1, 2012); 
and Yahoo! Developer Network, YAHOO!, http://developer.yahoo.com/everything.html (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
 18 Mobile platforms and SNSs are not the first to face concerns about the way their technical 
design choices and default settings impact user privacy, although the vast and constantly 
changing range of data and interactions they facilitate heighten these problems for SNSs.  
See Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 121 (discussing the introduction of Radio Frequency 
Identification Tags); Marc Rotenberg, Communications Privacy:  Implications for Network De-
sign, 36 COMM. ACM 61, 63 (1993) (discussing the introduction of Caller ID). 
 19 Following boyd and Ellison, “We define social network sites as web-based services that al-
low individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, 
(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and 
traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.  The nature 
and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site.”  boyd & Ellison, supra 
note 15, at 2. 
 20 Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Jan. 
23, 2012). 
 21 Ruchi Sanghvi, Facebook Gets a Facelift, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Sept. 5, 2006, 4:03 AM), 
https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=2207967130&fb_comment_id= (discussing 
the introduction of News Feed and Mini-Feed). 
 22 Id. 
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for display.  The feature could not be turned off, and publication was 
non-selective:  any “friend” on a user’s friends list received the status 
updates.  The status updates were pushed out, rather than sought 
out.23 
This shift altered the access paradigm in two significant ways.  
First, it removed the ability of the recipient to moderate the terms of 
sharing.  Instead of an all-you-can-eat-on-demand smorgasbord, 
friends found themselves at the receiving end of an always-on fire 
hose of status updates.  Second, News Feed removed the transaction 
costs associated with a friend actually accessing a status update that 
was available as a policy matter.  This merged the theoretical and ac-
tual audience for any given status update.  The introduction of News 
Feed left Facebook users rather paradoxically feeling stalked and 
spammed by their so-called friends.  Facebook users were upset about 
the heightened visibility of their actions and the sometimes-
formidable demand on their attention.24 
a.  Facebook’s Defense 
Facebook responded to users’ privacy complaints by improving 
the controls that allowed users to manage some of the types of infor-
mation posted to the Feed.25  However, in the mind of Facebook 
founder Mark Zuckerberg, the introduction of News Feed did noth-
ing to disrupt users’ privacy;26 it maintained the status quo.  The in-
formation that users chose to share with specific groups of people—
friends and networks—remained available to only those groups.  Fa-
 
 23 Andrés Sanchez, Facebook Feeding Frenzy:  Resistance-through-Distance and Resistance-through-
Persistence in the Societied Network, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 275 (2009), available at 
http://www.surveillance-andsociety.org/ojs/index.php/journal/article/viewFile/frenzy/
frenzy; Todd Simmons, The Ethics of Privacy on Facebook (Apr. 4, 2011) (unpublished 
MBA paper, St. Edward’s University), http://todd-simmons.com/docs/
MBA10_GlobalDigital_PrivacyEthics.pdf. 
 24 The initial shock at the change prompted a negative response from Facebook’s users, 
with one anti-News Feed group gaining 10,000 followers in the first day of News Feed’s re-
lease.  Users were unhappy with the widespread distribution of activity that was previously 
hidden in practical obscurity, despite the fact that the information itself had not changed. 
 25 See Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Launches Additional Privacy Controls for News 
Feed and Mini-Feed (Sept. 8, 2006), http://www.facebook.com/
press/releases.php?p=643 (describing the new privacy controls implemented in response 
to user feedback about the News Feed and Mini-Feed). 
 26 Mark Zuckerberg, An Open Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Sept. 8, 
2006, 5:48 AM), https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=2208562130. 
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cebook had not altered27 its users’ decisions about who should have 
access to their personal information.  Ruchi Sanghvi, the product 
manager for News Feed, stressed this point during News Feed’s re-
lease, stating, “News Feed and Mini-Feed are a different way of look-
ing at the news about your friends, but they do not give out any in-
formation that wasn’t already visible.  Your privacy settings remain 
the same—the people who couldn’t see your info before still can’t see 
it now.”28 
b.  Users’ Perspectives 
Facebook users had a different perspective.  For them the mechan-
ism of sharing mattered.  While information was still withheld or 
shared based on their preferences, the dynamics of sharing in the 
pre-News Feed environment had apparently informed users’ deci-
sions about whether to share in the first place.  The transaction costs 
afforded by the pull environment, which required a Facebook user’s 
friends to visit the user’s page in order to view status updates, em-
bedded an additional layer of practical privacy protection in the pre-
News Feed environment. 
Reducing the time and effort required to view status updates trig-
gered two separate privacy concerns.  First, the recipients of News 
Feed complained of being “spammed” by their friends.  As summed 
up by one user: 
Personally, I don’t have a problem with the information being there.  I 
just have a problem with that HUGE amount of information in my face 
all the time.  I don’t care who added a new book to their favorites; if I 
wanted to know someone’s favorite books, I read through their profile.29 
Prior to News Feed’s introduction, users with permission to view sta-
tus updates maintained enormous discretion as to when and if they 
did so.30  The move to a push model of distribution placed greater 
demands on their time and attention. 
Second, the increased exposure created by the shift from a bill-
board to a broadcast made the experience substantively different for 
 
 27 Sanghvi, supra note 21; Mark Zuckerberg, Calm Down.  Breathe.  We Hear You., THE 
FACEBOOK BLOG (Sept. 5, 2006, 10:45 PM), https://blog.facebook.com/
blog.php?post=2208197130. 
 28 Sanghvi, supra note 21.  We should note that the fine-grained privacy controls that now 
exist for News Feed posts were not available when the feature launched. 
 29 Enoxice, Information Overload, Comment to Facebook Changes Provoke Uproar Among Users, 
SLASHDOT (Sept. 5, 2006, 9:47 PM), http://slashdot.org/story/06/09/06/0112231/
facebook-changes-provoke-uproar-among-users. 
 30 See Stephanie Buck, The Evolution of Facebook Profile [PICS], MASHABLE (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://mashable.com/2011/09/22/facebook-profile-evolution. 
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users posting status updates.  Previously, users enjoyed a level of 
“practical obscurity” even from those with whom they chose to share 
information.  While users may have granted a large number of indi-
viduals’ permission to view their status updates, they knew that the 
transaction costs of searching and viewing their page meant that only 
those truly motivated to do so would actually “follow” them.  With the 
introduction of News Feed, Facebook users faced far greater actual 
exposure.  The transaction costs created theoretical and actual au-
diences:  News Feed fused them.  Data that previously had to be ac-
tively sought was now as a matter of course aggressively and routinely 
publicized to friends.  In the words of a Facebook user, “Stalking is 
supposed to be hard.”31  News Feed made it easy. 
Many experienced the News Feed as a privacy violation despite its 
continued deference to individuals’ decisions about whether and with 
whom to share status updates and the consistency of the data at issue.  
The reduction in transaction costs rather than a change in privacy 
settings—or the change in mechanism of distribution, not the formal 
rules governing distribution—is what triggered the privacy concern. 
II.  UNPACKING NEWS FEED 
A. News Feed and Fair Information Practice Principles 
As Zuckerberg and Sanghvi rightly argued, Facebook users had af-
firmatively indicated a desire to share information with the set of in-
dividuals who received status updates via the News Feed.32  They 
claimed that the company’s actions were completely consistent with 
respecting users’ privacy.33  Examining Facebook’s actions through 
the lens of information privacy as “informational self-determination,” 
the company’s position is understandable, perhaps even defensible.  
However, rather than attending to user claims of privacy harms, this 
position merely defines privacy to place them out of scope.  For users, 
claims were not about binary choices but about expectations 
grounded in both policy and structural constraints, and neither were 
user claims about informational self-determination.  Rather, they 
were about the dynamics of revelation in a broad, undifferentiated 
network of connections. 
 
 31 Angry Students Lash Out at Facebook.com Privacy Changes, FOX NEWS (Sept. 8, 2006), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,212722,00.html. 
 32 Zuckerberg, supra note 26 (discussing what he thought users would want out of Face-
book); see also Zuckerberg, supra note 27. 
 33 Zuckerberg, supra note 27. 
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1.  FIPPs and Theories of “Informational Self-Determination” 
The Fair Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) embody a 
rights-based framework of “informational self-determination.”34  They 
reflect a liberal construction of privacy that seeks to support “the 
claim[s] of individuals . . . to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to oth-
ers,”35 through the imposition of processes that support the individu-
al’s agency over the flow of personal information.  In practice, FIPPs 
drive the adoption of policies and mechanisms through which “indi-
viduals can assert their own privacy interests and claims if they so 
wish,” allowing them to define “the content of privacy rights and in-
terests.”36  Privacy is afforded through processes that are fair and pro-
vide individuals with the capacity to make fully informed decisions 
about their personal information. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”)’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows 
of Personal Data provide an influential statement of FIPPs.37  The 
Guidelines set out eight principles that affirm the individual’s right to 
self-determination.38  These principles place obligations on entities 
 
 34 Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 6 (setting forth the term “information self-
determination” in a German court decision limiting the intrusiveness of the German 
Census Act of 1983). 
 35 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 36 COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY:  POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (2006). 
 37 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, supra note 
2. 
 38 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines, the most 
widely cited statement of FIPPs, adopted the following eight principles in 1980: 
1. Collection Limitation Principle 
There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should 
be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge 
or consent of the data subject. 
2. Data Quality Principle 
Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used 
and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete, and 
kept up-to-date. 
3. Purpose Specification Principle 
The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later 
than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfill-
ment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purpos-
es and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose. 
4. Use Limitation Principle 
Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for pur-
poses other than those specified in accordance with [the Purpose Specification 
Principle] except:  a) with the consent of the data subject; or b) by the authority of 
law. 
5. Security Safeguards Principle 
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that collect and process data, requiring:  transparency about the types 
of information collected and the way the information will be used; 
limits on data collection—namely that “data should be obtained by 
lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or 
consent of the data subject”; provision of data subject rights to access 
and accuracy; and protection for collected data against breach and 
corruption.39 
The FIPPs were designed for an era where big government or 
large corporations collected information about individuals.40  The in-
formation might be sold or shared but was generally intended for 
consumption by the company or organization that collected it.  The 
FIPPs did not anticipate a world where companies would design plat-
forms through which individuals would share information with other 
individuals or with the broad public (and by default, with the plat-
form owner).  Unsurprisingly, given this history, FIPPs provides in-
complete guidance to platform companies with respect to the lateral 
privacy issues that arise among their users. 
 
Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such 
risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of 
data. 
6. Openness Principle 
There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and 
policies with respect to personal data.  Means should be readily available of estab-
lishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their 
use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller. 
7. Individual Participation Principle 
An individual should have the right:  a) to obtain from a data controller, or other-
wise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him; 
b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him within a reasonable time; at 
a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable manner; and in a form that is 
readily intelligible to him; c) to be given reasons if a request made under subpara-
graphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to 
challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data 
erased, rectified, completed or amended. 
8. Accountability Principle 
A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures, which give 
effect to the principles stated above. 
  Id.; see also COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY:  DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 101–11 (1992) (describing the OECD prin-
ciples). 
 39 Id. at 106 (quoting OECD, supra note 2). 
 40 A U.S. government advisory committee originally proposed the FIPPs in 1973 “in re-
sponse to [the] growing use of automated data systems containing information about in-
dividuals.”  Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practice:  A Basic History, Version 1.86, at 1 
(2011), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf. 
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2.  “Informational Self-determination” and News Feed 
Assuming that Facebook desired to meet their users’ privacy 
needs, the News Feed incident suggests that grounding efforts to do 
so in a conception of privacy as individual self-determination would 
have been insufficient.  As noted above, Facebook defended its ac-
tions by indirect reference to the concept of “informational self-
determination.”41  Facebook claimed that its practice of affording in-
dividuals an opportunity to control access to their profiles fully dis-
charged its privacy obligations with respect to this aspect of News 
Feed.  User complaints suggest otherwise. 
The primary purpose and the use limitation principles of FIPPs 
are the core instantiations of the commitment to individual control.  
Examining News Feed under either principle would not raise an im-
mediate flag for a lawyer or technologist.  The “Purpose Specification 
Principle” requires corporations to specify the personal data collected 
and to limit its use to the fulfillment of the purposes for which the 
user provides it.  The purpose is assessed from the perspective of the 
user, not the company.  In the context of News Feed, users were not 
only informed and familiar with the information being collected, but 
in fact were solely responsible for its creation and contribution.  Us-
ers determined the contents of status updates.  Users created them 
for the explicit purpose of sharing with their friends (and potentially 
others).  Users directly controlled the audience to whom they were 
accessible.  While Facebook may be using status updates for other 
purposes, at least with respect to disclosures to friends and networks, 
Facebook was clear about the purpose and afforded users control.  
The “Use Limitation Principle,” which generally prohibits the disclo-
sure or use of personal information for purposes other than those in-
itially proposed and understood by the user absent consent,42 was 
clearly not implicated by News Feed either.  Facebook users had de-
termined who was authorized to access their profiles, and thus their 
status updates.  The shift to News Feed did not disrupt their choices.  
If anything, it furthered their aims. 
Examining Facebook’s policy in isolation provides little warning 
about the privacy reaction News Feed would receive, precisely be-
cause the policy itself was not at issue, as it had not changed.  Put 
another way, only a consideration that took the technical affordances 
as a form of regulation on par with that of policy would draw Face-
 
 41 Zuckerberg, supra note 27. 
 42 Use for an additional purpose may lawfully occur where authorized by law. 
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book’s attention to the additional layer of de facto privacy protec-
tion43 offered by its earlier architecture.  This sort of holistic analysis 
is necessary to understand the significant role that technical regula-
tion played in users’ policy choices. 
Unfortunately, FIPPs do not naturally direct institutional focus 
toward mechanisms that implicitly or explicitly regulate information 
flows.  While Privacy Impact Assessments (“PIA”) were introduced to 
address the potentially disruptive effect of technology changes on 
privacy expectations,44 they are generally deferential toward com-
pliance with a stated policy.  If a policy states that personal informa-
tion is to be available to a given audience, a PIA will not invite an in-
terrogation of the degree of openness.  Where a tolerated privacy 
intrusion is magnified by a change in technology, the output of a PIA 
may suggest mitigations.  However, where a change in technology ad-
vances a policy objective aligned with privacy—such as availability of 
status updates by those users who had indicated should receive 
them—a PIA would be unlikely to identify the change as one to be 
mitigated.  Given that the permission structure of the shared data 
(status updates) remained unchanged,45 and that, at least from the 
point of view of Facebook management, the intent had not shifted,46 
it is highly unlikely that PIAs or similar FIPPs-based tools would have 
alerted Facebook to the privacy fallout of this change.  
Microsoft’s “Privacy Guidelines for Developing Software Products 
and Services,” a document “based on the core concepts” of the 
FIPPs,47 reflects this focus on privacy as effectuating policy choices.  It 
provides “guidance for creating notice and consent experiences, pro-
viding sufficient data security, maintaining data integrity, offering 
customer access, and supplying controls when developing software 
products and Web sites.”48  While these foci are all important aspects 
of managing the use of personal information by the corporation, they 
are largely irrelevant to the user complaints sparked by News Feed.  
Although the introduction of PIAs surely gives FIPPs more meaning 
 
 43 See Surden, supra note 8, at 1607 (explaining “latent structural constraints”). 
 44 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS:  THE PRIVACY OFFICE 
OFFICIAL GUIDANCE (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/
gc_1209396374339.shtm#2. 
 45  Posts were still limited to friends and network members. 
 46  This is information users wanted to share; otherwise they would not have posted it. 
 47 Privacy Guidelines for Developing Software Products and Services Version 3.1, MICROSOFT CORP. 
5 (Sept. 2008), http://www.microsoft.com/download/en/details.aspx?displaylang=
en&id=16048. 
 48 Id. 
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in firm activities, it does not reorient the privacy analysis to any great 
extent. 
Second, the privacy claims of recipients of status updates cannot 
be framed as an issue of loss of control over personal information.  
The recipient’s information was not at issue.  Thus, FIPPs frame-
works’ exclusive focus on informational self-determination signifi-
cantly undermines their utility.  Recipients’ complaints were about 
the increased level of time and attention their Facebook friends de-
manded via the News Feed feature.  In the role of recipients, users 
experienced News Feed as an intrusion on their time and attention—
not a threat to their personal information.  The intrusion-related pri-
vacy claims of Facebook users resonate with statutory frameworks ad-
dressing unsolicited commercial communications.49  They protect the 
right to be let alone, or, at least, the right to exert some control over 
the level of, or conditions of, accessibility to others’ communications.  
FIPPs focus on protecting the individual as a data subject is complete-
ly unhelpful in either explaining or addressing this privacy concern. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the privacy claims made by 
Facebook users in both roles—status updaters and recipients—
suggest that users perceived the introduction of News Feed to put 
their relationship with others at risk.  Users reacted to being 
“spammed” and “stalked” by their Facebook friends.  Clearly, either 
activity puts the friend relationship at risk.  Surely a friend who stalks 
or spams risks hasty relegation to a less favorable status. 
The transaction costs that mediated sharing pre-News Feed were 
essential to the protection of “friend”-ship as understood on the Fa-
cebook platform.  In contrast, FIPPs and other data protection mod-
els center the individual—his freedom, autonomy, and dignity—as 
the object of protection.  From users’ complaints, the object at risk 
appears to be, at least in part, the viability of Facebook friendships.  
While FIPPs based mechanisms that facilitate individual control over 
the sharing of information may be useful to the maintenance of 
friendship, protecting such relationships is neither their goal nor 
their justification.  It is an incidental output of a model centered on 
the atomistic individual protecting her own interests. 
Attention to FIPPs during the design process would have been of 
little assistance in either identifying or avoiding the privacy violations 
 
 49 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006); CAN-SPAM Act of 
2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227 (2006). 
1004 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
Facebook users claimed.50  FIPPs focuses the privacy analysis on actors 
and the policies that bind them.  In doing so, it diverts attention from 
the importance of the mechanisms through which policy choices ma-
nifest and the background against which such choices are framed.  
FIPPs appear ill-suited to identify or address privacy issues that arise 
due to gradations in accessibility caused by shifts in technology.  
Equally importantly, FIPPs are concerned solely with individuals as 
data subjects, while the complex social interaction represented by 
News Feed presented privacy claims for users positioned as data sub-
jects and as recipients of communications.  The orientation of FIPPs 
is not helpful in identifying or addressing this second set of privacy 
claims.  Finally, FIPPs justify privacy based on the individual’s auton-
omy, freedom, and dignity.  Facebook users’ privacy claims centered 
on the room they created for relationships among individuals.  While 
they did not offer friendship as a justification for preferring the pre-
News Feed information flows, they were concerned with the impact of 
the change on the category of Facebook friends as constructed under 
the initial rules. 
B. Alternative Explanations of News Feed’s Privacy Failings 
If we suspend disbelief and assume that Facebook desired to meet 
their users’ privacy requirements, our examination of News Feed 
complaints suggests that efforts grounded exclusively in a conception 
of privacy as individual self-determination are insufficient to identify 
the privacy issues for three inter-related reasons:  they focus primarily 
on the role of policy in determining privacy outcomes, thereby eclips-
ing the role that technical artifacts play in protecting and eroding 
privacy; they foreclose inquiries into privacy issues unrelated to the 
protection of personal information, such as the right to be let alone 
or control access to the self; and, they center the protection of the 
 
 50  The Article 29 Working Party, established by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, is com-
prised of the heads of EU member states’ data protection authorities and is the indepen-
dent EU Advisory Body on Data Protection and Privacy.  In its “Opinion on Online Social 
Networking” it provides little concrete direction on lateral privacy issues stating, “SNS 
should offer privacy-friendly default settings which allow users to freely and specifically 
consent to access to their profile’s content that is beyond their self-selected contacts in 
order to reduce the risk of unlawful processing by third parties.”  Article 29 Working Par-
ty May 2009 Opinion on Online Social Networking, at 7.  In a letter to Facebook, the 
Working Party provided some explanation of what settings are not “privacy-friendly” writ-
ing, “Pursuant to the Data Protection Directive, the default privacy settings offered by 
SNS should not allow access beyond self-selected contacts and any further access should 
be an explicit choice by the user.”  Article 29 Working Party May 12, 2010 Letter to Face-
book. 
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individual as the singular goal of privacy protection.  These gaps limit 
FIPPs’ ability to identify and solve lateral privacy issues that suffuse 
SNSs and platforms generally.  We also believe these gaps commend 
other theories for our consideration. 
The first limitation revealed by our analysis of News Feed directs 
our attention to theories that attend to the varied mechanisms of pri-
vacy protection—be it physical or code-based, social norms, or market 
powers.  It suggests theories that focus on socio-technical systems or, 
at the very least, take the affordances and limitations technical arti-
facts provide seriously.  Second, it suggests privacy theories that we 
will describe as capacious in that they offer more inclusive, fluid, or at 
least not rigidly pre-determined definitions of privacy.  Privacy is im-
plicated by many acts, not just the wresting or denial of control over 
personal information.  Our analysis of News Feed illustrates that mul-
tiple definitions of privacy are in play in peer-to-peer interactions on 
SNSs, and that multiple activities can be viewed as diminishing priva-
cy.  Finally, users lamented the impact of the loss of privacy on the 
category of Facebook friends—including actual friends and others 
with whom they wish to maintain social ties, as tenuous as they may 
be.  Theories that conceive of privacy as protecting relationships and 
society and not, or at least not exclusively, the individual help explain 
such claims.  Such theories position privacy as necessary for various 
forms of social organization, rather than to the individual in some ab-
stract and atomistic sense.  There are several theories of privacy that 
exhibit these traits.  Below we unpack the News Feed case to see 
whether the theories are as helpful in understanding privacy as our 
conceptual mapping suggests. 
1.  Alternative Theories of Privacy 
We find the work of three theorists responsive to the facets of the 
News Feed privacy issues that are missed by a FIPPs-based approach.  
These theories position various contextually situated and desirable 
forms of social organization and activity to be the justification of pri-
vacy, thus driving consideration of the needs of multiple actors rather 
than only those of the data subject, and taking stock of the contribu-
tions of non-legal regulators to privacy’s protection.  Psychologist Ir-
win Altman views privacy as “an interpersonal boundary process by which 
a person or group regulates interactions with others.”51  Legal theorist 
 
 51 IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:  PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE, 
TERRITORY AND CROWDING 6 (1975). 
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Robert Post claims privacy tort law is best understood as socially va-
lued protection of core individual rights that do “not simply uphold 
the interests of individuals against the demands of community, but 
instead safeguards rules of civility that in some significant measure 
constitute both individuals and community.”52  Philosopher Helen 
Nissenbaum claims privacy is achieved through adherence to contex-
tually appropriate norms of information flow—“contextual integri-
ty”—that support socially valued interactions within specific spheres 
of social life.53  These theorists vest privacy’s justification in the pro-
tection of connection and community, rather than the individual.  
Their work acknowledges the importance of non-legal regulators.  
Because their work considers privacy in the context of community, it 
takes a more capacious and inclusive stance on privacy’s objectives 
and form. 
a.  Social Justifications for Affording Privacy 
Unlike data protection and FIPPs that justify privacy in terms of its 
instrumental or intrinsic value for the individual, Altman, Nissen-
baum, and Post justify privacy in terms of its support for interpersonal 
and group connection, community, the constructed and relational 
self, social utility, and communal solidarity.  This perspective proves 
helpful in analyzing the News Feed case.  It accounts for users as ac-
tors within a community—in Facebook’s case, a socio-technical sys-
tem—not merely as data subjects. 
Altman provides the fullest exploration of privacy’s essential role 
in social relationships.54  He posits that “the concept of privacy is cen-
tral to understanding environment and behavior relationships”55 and 
that privacy rightly construed is “an interpersonal boundary process by 
which a person or group regulates interaction with others.”56  Focus-
ing on the process aspect of privacy, Altman emphasizes privacy’s 
 
 52 Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:  Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 
77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989). 
 53 Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 138–39, 155. 
 54 ALTMAN, supra note 51, at vii (“General textbooks on environment and behavior are be-
ginning to appear, but many cut an extremely wide swath, often treating some topics in 
only a superficial fashion.  I have brought together research on four central issues in as 
comprehensive and as detailed a fashion as possible in order to provide needed concep-
tual handles and lend some coherence to at least part of the environment and behavior 
field.”); see also Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age:  The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 581–82 (1998), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/k625w27565861919/fulltext.pdf. 
 55 ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 6. 
 56 Id. 
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constant redefinition across relationships, time, and sentiment, and 
physical and psychological terrain.  Privacy is imminently fungible 
and a dialectic by nature that involves “a balancing of opposing 
forces—to be open and accessible to others and to be shut off or 
closed to others.”57  The dynamic and dialectic aspects of privacy defy 
reduction to a fixed set of protections or affordances defining a pri-
vate state.  Instead, it is a “process of optimization.”58  Post, too, argues 
that privacy is better understood as justified by the needs of commu-
nity.  He states that “the tort [of privacy] . . . safeguards rules of civili-
ty that in some significant measure constitute both individuals and 
community.”59  Post’s work positions privacy tort law as a flexible me-
chanism that regulates boundaries between the self, groups, and oth-
ers, and, in doing so, plays a key role in iteratively defining, structur-
ing, and affirming the self and communities. 
Examining the complaints of Facebook users one is struck by their 
concern for relationships.  While Facebook users objected to being 
stalked and spammed, they expressed concern about the effects of 
inadvertent stalking and spamming on their relationships.  They 
could position themselves on both ends of the News Feed pipe and 
were concerned not only about themselves but also about its potential 
impact on their friendships.  From their perspective these new condi-
tions put the willingness to connect at risk. 
Users feared that the change in distributional norms would affect 
social relations.  As discussed below, the distributional norm pro-
tected two privacy interests that were perceived as central to the Fa-
cebook friend relationship.  The pull norm facilitated rampant shar-
ing and rather promiscuous “friend-ing,” based upon an expectation 
of limited actual revelation of information.  While updates were avail-
able to a relatively broad audience, they remained practically ob-
scure.  The tacit understanding, expressed in user comments, was 
that only a limited group of their Facebook friends—their “true 
friends,” their “close friends,” or their “family”—would exert the ef-
fort necessary to scrutinize their activities and musings.  This practice 
provided users the freedom to post relatively indiscriminately, be-
cause their friends retained ultimate control over the receipt of posts, 
freeing the poster from the fear of being perceived as a nuisance or 
an intrusion.  On the recipient end, users were happy to be friend-ed 
because prior to the introduction of News Feed they maintained con-
 
 57 Id. at 23. 
 58 Id. at 11, 25–27 (illustrating the variables involved in trying to reach an optimal level of 
privacy in social interactions). 
 59 Post, supra note 52, at 959. 
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trol over the timing and quantity of status updates they ultimately re-
ceived. 
As Facebook users well know, “Facebook friends,” are often not 
friends in the traditional sense.  As danah boyd explains, “[t]he term 
‘friend’ in the context of social network sites is not the same as in 
everyday vernacular.  And people know this. . . . The term is terrible 
but it means something different on these sites; it’s not to anyone’s 
advantage to assume that the rules of friendship apply to Friend-
ship.”60  A tongue-in-cheek illustration of this point is offered by the 
“Whopper Sacrifice” campaign that Burger King ran as a Facebook 
Platform application.61  The campaign offered Facebook users who 
purged ten Facebook friends deemed unworthy of their weight in 
beef a coupon for a free Whopper.62  Burger King dispersed many 
coupons.63 
Acknowledging and setting aside objections to Facebook’s appro-
priation of the term “friend,” the introduction of News Feed put the 
relationship of “friend” as defined by Facebook at risk.  While it is 
relatively easy to mock the term friend as used on Facebook, the rela-
tionship has meaning and value for members despite its variance 
from the common understanding of the term.  News Feed removed 
the transaction costs that aided social sorting—an individual’s friends 
in the vernacular sense were more likely to be consistently motivated 
enough to overcome the transaction costs of the pre-News Feed ar-
rangement, while an individual’s Facebook Friends were not.  The 
pull environment thus acted as a filter, sorting friends from Facebook 
Friends.  This was particularly important because the sharing policy 
lacked any sort of fine grained functionality that would allow you to 
selectively push out status updates depending upon their content, or 
to select a limited group of friends with whom to share a specific up-
date.  While it was coarse, the pull mechanism acted as a rough filter.  
One could go so far as to argue that the transaction cost associated 
with the pre-News Feed environment was constitutive of the category 
Facebook Friend.  It likely contributed to the willingness of users to 
maintain a vast array of weak ties—acquaintances or other loose con-
 
 60 danah boyd, Facebook’s “Privacy Trainwreck”:  Exposure, Invasion, and Drama, APOPHENIA 
BLOG (Sept. 8, 2006), http://www.danah.org/papers/FacebookAndPrivacy.html. 
 61 See Jenna Wortham, The Value of a Facebook Friend?  About 37 Cents, N.Y.TIMES BITS (Jan. 9, 
2009), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/are-facebook-friends-worth-their-
weight-in-beef/ (discussing the purpose and motivation behind Burger King’s “Whopper 
Sacrifice” campaign). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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nections between individuals64—which research has shown are advan-
tageous for employment opportunities and gaining “diverse perspec-
tives and new information.”65  Prior to News Feed, one’s weak ties 
were shielded from the minutiae of one’s updates unless motivated to 
seek them out.  The introduction of News Feed inundated users with 
too much information in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. 
Post’s conception of privacy as “rest[ing] not upon a perceived 
opposition between persons and social life, but rather upon their in-
terdependence”66 provides additional texture to this story.  The priva-
cy norms helped individuals in their role as generators and users of 
updates within this arguably misnamed “friend” relationship.  As Elli-
son notes, “Before social network sites were popular, people used 
communication strategies like gossip and the holiday newsletter to 
maintain awareness of distant friends, old coworkers, and far-flung 
relatives.  Through status updates and feeds, SNSs enable individuals 
to broadcast both major life changes and ephemeral activities to their 
broad network, allowing others to engage in lightweight social surveil-
lance.”67  Like privacy tort law, the mechanism of information distri-
bution and acquisition helped maintain civility.  As the likelihood 
that one’s “weak ties” would receive and view status updates in-
creased, the actual audience extended beyond the intended au-
dience.68  This expansion in actual audience was experienced as a vi-
olation of norms of sharing by both parties.  In response, users 
devised coping mechanisms, such as altering the substance of their 
updates or narrowing their circle of Facebook friends.69 
 
 64 Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties:  A Network Theory Revisited, in SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE AND NETWORK ANALYSIS 105, 105–07 (Peter V. Marsden & Nan Lin eds., 1982) 
(discussing the function, benefits and drawbacks of “weak ties” to the individual and the 
social structure generally). 
 65 Nicole B. Ellison et al., Social Network Sites and Society:  Current Trends and Future Possibilities, 
INTERACTIONS, Jan. 2009, at 6, 7, available at https://www.msu.edu/~steinfie/
EllisonLampeSteinfield2009.pdf. 
 66 Post, supra note 52, at 959 (offering a normative account of privacy that does not focus 
just on the protection of individuals, but also on protection of the community, and find-
ing that privacy torts in the common law uphold social norms, which in turn contribute 
to both community and individual identity). 
 67 Ellison et al., supra note 65, at 7. 
 68 Researchers have found that expectancy violations by weak ties—defined as an undesired 
social group viewing a Facebook profile—was a predictor of user decisions to make a pro-
file friends-only.  Fred Stutzman & Jacob Kramer-Duffield, Friends Only:  Examining a Pri-
vacy-Enhancing Behavior in Facebook, in CHI 2010:  ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS 
IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS (2010), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753559. 
 69 Id. 
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b.  Taking Technical Artifacts Seriously 
Altman and Nissenbaum explicitly focus on the broad range of 
mechanisms that afford and define privacy in a given context:  facili-
tating boundary regulation or constituting the contextually appropri-
ate norms of information flow, respectively.  Their theories attune 
privacy analysis to protections found in norms, structures and mar-
kets as well as law and policy.  They draw attention to non-human ac-
tors who structure and order interactions—structuring privacy by de-
sign.  While Post’s focus is on law, he draws on the work of Erving 
Goffman whose account of the socially structured articulation of the 
self as a presentation before others documents the multitude of ways 
norms of behavior provide privacy.70  Implicitly, Post, too, views law as 
only one regulating force.  Collectively, these theorists draw attention 
to the full range of mechanisms that individuals rely upon in daily life 
to afford varying forms of privacy.71 
This attention to structural privacy protections is key to under-
standing the reaction of Facebook users to News Feed.  In Nissen-
baum’s theory of contextual integrity, “norms of appropriateness dic-
tate what information about persons is appropriate, or fitting, to 
reveal in a particular context.  Generally, these norms circumscribe 
the type or nature of information about various individuals that, with-
in a given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be 
revealed.”72  Norms of distribution, by extension, examine whether 
information’s distribution, or flow, is consistent with context-specific 
norms ranging from expectations of confidentiality and discretion to 
entitlement and obligation to reuse or re-disseminate.73  These shared 
norms—which can vary culturally, temporally, and along other di-
mensions—provide a set of background expectations that Nissen-
baum claims define privacy in each context.  When information flows 
are inconsistent with these norms, the resulting disruption of expec-
tations is perceived as a privacy breach.  Nissenbaum’s central thesis is 
that there are no a priori, one-size-fits-all rules that protect privacy.  
Instead, she states “what bothers people, what we see as dangerous, 
threatening, disturbing, and annoying, what makes us indignant, re-
sistant, unsettled, and outraged in our experience of contemporary 
systems and practices . . . is not that they diminish our control and 
 
 70 ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). 
 71 Post, supra note 52, at 971–73 (1989). 
 72 Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 138. 
 73 Id. at 140. 
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pierce our secrecy, but that they transgress context-relevant informa-
tional norms.”74 
The shift in a distributional norm—from pull to push—unsettled 
two expectations about how widely viewed Facebook status updates 
would be.  The first expectation was based on a distributional norm 
informed not exclusively by the information’s availability but rather 
by its availability plus the transaction costs of its discoverability.  As 
noted above, the transaction costs associated with discovering data 
acted as a check on the actual audience for the average status update, 
effectively culling out Facebook friends.  The second expectation that 
was violated was the relatively unobtrusive nature of one’s status and 
other updates to one’s friends—we hesitate to call them recipients 
because, while the information was available to them, whether they 
actually received it was under their control.  Again, the expectation 
was informed by the mechanism of distribution—pull—not just per-
mission to access the information.  As noted above, the shift to News 
Feed literally force-fed individuals’ Facebook friends a diet of daily 
minutiae:  it was an informational assault on one’s Facebook friends. 
Altman’s theory, which describes privacy as a “dialectic process” of 
boundary regulation, is perhaps the most useful in explaining the 
importance of qualitative shifts in accessibility brought about by 
technologies that reduce transaction costs.75  In likening the process 
of privacy regulation to that of a cell membrane mediating the exter-
nal and internal environment, Altman draws attention to the fluidity 
and dependency of the privacy states individuals desire and on the 
impact even subtle changes can have upon them.  Altman posits pri-
vacy’s purpose as interpersonal boundary regulation in the service of 
developing knowledge and defining the self, and assessing and man-
aging the relationship between the self and others.76 
In emphasizing the permeable membrane between the self and 
others, Altman’s theory invites focus on the importance and breadth 
of mechanisms used to manage privacy—structures, policies, and 
norms.  Altman, like Nissenbaum, opens our eyes to a broader inter-
personal context in which individuals deploy this range of mechan-
isms to manage their connections to others in the complex social 
process that constructs privacy.  From the “practical obscurity”77 re-
 
 74 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT:  TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE 186 (2010). 
 75 ALTMAN, supra note 50, at 6. 
 76 Id. 
 77 U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 
(1989). 
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sulting from the cost associated with discovering accessible informa-
tion, or deriving insights through data-mining techniques, to the 
norms that cause individuals to avert their gaze to things in plain 
sight and resist asking and responding to questions about others’ pri-
vate lives, Altman focuses attention on the non-legal methods that are 
consciously and unconsciously used to regulate access to the self.78  In 
News Feed, the mechanism at issue influenced the degree of com-
munication that regularly occurred between Facebook friends.  The 
introduction of News Feed simultaneously increased feelings of sur-
veillance and informational assault as the membrane separating Fa-
cebook friends became more porous and permeable. 
The News Feed incident draws our attention to the dialogue be-
tween privacy and publicity, self-identity and community-identity, and 
connection and seclusion that permeate the process of privacy.  It il-
lustrates privacy as a fluid and intuitive practice, not the conscious, 
deliberative, and discrete process envisioned in theories that focus 
exclusively on individual control.  Altman’s rich description of priva-
cy’s significance in human relations and its constantly changing state 
root it in distinctly human processes of cyclical discovery, negotiation, 
and reification. 
The information architecture, technical defaults, and terms of 
service agreements for platforms heavily inform the information shar-
ing norms of a growing “networked public.”79  The information shar-
ing norms of SNSs—increasingly referred to as “networked publics”—
inform, challenge, and alter existing norms and create new mem-
branes with new properties, at times inconsistent with the expecta-
tions individuals import based on past experience in non-technically-
mediated environments.  The interaction of the various players, the 
artifacts they produce, and the policies that govern them produce a 
“networked space”80 just as urban planners, residents, and others 
 
 78 ALTMAN, supra note 51. 
 79 A networked public consists of “the spaces and audiences that are bound together 
through technological networks (i.e., the Internet, mobile networks, etc.)” and whose in-
teractions the network mediates.  danah boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites:  The 
Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 
125 (David Buckingham ed., 2008) (distinguishing networked publics that provide “sear-
chability” from other mediated publics that in turn differ from experiences of being in 
public in physical space because of the persistence of data, the replicability of data, and 
the invisibility of audience). 
 80 See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 213 (2007) (“The im-
portant question is not what kind of space cyberspace is, but what kind of space a world 
that includes cyberspace is and will become.  Cyberspace is part of lived space, and it is 
through its connections to lived space that cyberspace must be comprehended and, as 
necessary, regulated.  In particular, a theory of cyberspace and space must consider the 
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produce the varied range of public spaces in the physical world.  
While the interactions in these networked spaces may be simple ex-
tensions of familiar interactions—and therefore bring with them con-
textually relevant norms—in other instances they will be novel inte-
ractions with no offline parallel that require greater attention to 
users’ understandings and constructions of context.81 
The News Feed example confirms Altman’s insight of the follow-
ing: 
[D]esigners need to deal with the behaviors that users employ to achieve 
desired levels of interaction. . . . These questions are behavioral and fo-
cus on the user as an active, coping organism that interacts with and em-
ploys the physical environment and other behaviors in various combina-
tions.  Thus these design questions imply the theme of creating 
responsive environments that users can interact with and that become ex-
tensions of their behavioral repertoires.82   
The Facebook engineers flipped a switch that greatly altered a 
mechanism that users intuitively relied upon to achieve a desired 
state of interaction.  It did so without warning and initially failed to 
create tools for users to react, adjust, and fine tune.  Rather than 
crafting a “responsive environment,” Facebook crafted an environ-
ment and demanded users to conform. 
c.  Multiple Objects of Privacy Protection 
The News Feed example reveals two separate perspectives on what 
privacy ought to protect.  While not mutually exclusive, they are dis-
tinct.  With respect to their status updates users expressed concern 
about the decrease in what is commonly known as practical obscurity.  
While users chose to provide their friends and networks access to 
their updates, they did so assuming that only a small set of those 
friends would exert effort to read them.  Friends who received status 
updates raised a second variety of privacy concern.  They felt bom-
barded and intruded upon, especially when considering the vague 
sense of “friend” many initially relied upon to forge these connec-
tions.  Users found themselves suddenly aware of the actions of 
 
rise of networked space, the emergent and contested relationship between networked 
space and embodied space, and the ways in which networked space alters, instantiates, 
and disrupts geographies of power.”). 
 81 See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS 32, 44 
(2011) (discussing the challenges of “online cases without straightforward social prece-
dents” and recommending a process that starts with an understanding of the “purposes 
and values” of the context, and what sort of norms will support the desired activities). 
 82 See ALTMAN, supra note 51, at 212 (emphasis omitted). 
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people with whom they had sometimes slight or even no real world 
personal connections. 
The first privacy complaint can be framed as protesting a loss of 
control over personal information.  However, such framing rings 
somewhat false given that the change in technology advanced the in-
dividual’s decision to share personal information they already in-
tended to share with others.  To underscore this point, if Facebook 
had rolled out a new feature that made it harder for unauthorized 
individuals to access status updates it seems quite certain that the 
complaints would have been far fewer and less strident.  It would be 
perceived as an improvement, an effort to further the user’s intent 
not to allow access—clean and simple.  Yet, here, where the technical 
improvement magnified the choice to share information, it was per-
ceived as disruptive and problematic.  This suggests that the relation-
ship between the technical change and the user’s policy choice—i.e., 
supportive or disruptive—is not itself dispositive, or predictive, of the 
user’s perception of its impact on privacy.  Or at least this seems to be 
the case where the change advances a choice to make information 
available or accessible. 
While one could argue that the object that privacy is deployed to 
protect in this first set of complaints is “control over personal infor-
mation,” the terms of the objections “stalking,” “watching,” and 
“monitoring” speak more to concerns about the surveillance News 
Feed enabled than to concerns about access to the information itself.  
This complaint may be better understood as a desire to limit access to 
the self.  While the self in this case is a digital representation, and one 
that is, in many instances, deliberately crafted to portray the specific 
self the individual desires to project into the world, it is nonetheless a 
manifestation of a real individual who has rights and interests con-
cerning access to that self.  In fact, one could argue that working with 
a concept of privacy focused on individual control over personal in-
formation is unhelpful in this instance, because the privacy analysis it 
triggers situates the actors and rules as the foremost objects of inter-
rogation.  This emphasis on actors shields the playing field from 
analysis.  Yet, here the transaction costs implicit in the prior playing 
field—the platform without News Feed—were an essential material 
condition of the user’s decision about whether to share or withhold 
status updates entirely. 
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This analysis aligns with other areas in which privacy protections 
are hotly contested.  For example, the dispute at the heart of the 
United States v. Jones83 case argued before the Supreme Court in 
2011 is whether moving from an environment where, due to advances 
in technology, it is not only legal but also practically feasible for po-
lice to track the daily movements of every citizen, at ten second in-
crements, in public places is different, as a matter of constitutional 
law, from an environment in which police possess the legal ability to 
do so but lack that technical wherewithal.  In other words, does a shift 
in transaction cost matter in a Fourth Amendment privacy analysis?  
In the oral arguments, one can hear the discomfort of the Court with 
an outcome that fails to account for the feasibility of omnipresent po-
lice surveillance, yet the sense of some that the tool they have to work 
with—the Fourth Amendment—gives them no ability to account for 
technical change that reduces the transaction costs that independent-
ly checked the rise of widespread police surveillance irrespective of 
the presence or absence of Constitutional barriers to the practice.  
The pliability of the playing field allows those who design it to radical-
ly shift transaction costs related to the movement and processing of 
information. 
Whether the entity shifting the field is Facebook, through disrupt-
ing mechanisms of distribution, or the police, through new methods 
of surveillance, the privacy responses suggest that the regulations im-
posed by the built environment are deeply significant for privacy.  
One metric against which we might consider the utility of a tool for 
privacy protection is how well it addresses these sorts of environmen-
tal changes.  To address them well, it must not only provide a justifi-
cation for penalizing certain shifts retroactively but also provide 
guidance to those attempting to respect privacy in their design deci-
sions.  As shown above, the formulation of privacy as individual con-
trol seems ill-suited to this task. 
The second privacy claim raised by users in the role of recipients 
cannot be framed as a concern about loss of control.  Recipients ob-
jected to new demands on their time and attention.  The introduc-
tion of News Feed was an intrusion.  In contrast, the theories of Alt-
man, Nissenbaum, and Post take a capacious view on the objects 
protected by privacy and the mechanisms of protection.  Protecting 
privacy in Altman’s view demands that individuals and groups be able 
to effectively deploy a variety of mechanisms to mediate their interac-
tions—exposure, seclusion, and connection—to others.  The boun-
 
 83 United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
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dary control mechanisms Altman identifies are of both input (de-
mands for connection) and output (efforts at connection) varieties.84  
This formulation is quite helpful in considering the News Feed inci-
dent.  It accounts for privacy across roles and in context.  Similarly, 
Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as “contextual integrity”85 finds priva-
cy to require respect for norms of information flow—
“appropriateness” and “distribution”—that facilitate socially valuable 
activities in various spheres of life.  While affording individuals con-
trol over personal information is one means of controlling informa-
tion flow, it is neither the only one nor the dominant one in many 
spheres.  With respect to News Feed, contextual integrity requires 
both finer-grained individual control over actual audience as well as 
the ability to control the volume and frequency of intrusions on the 
individual’s time and attention.  The justification offered for both 
forms of control was not the protection of the individual—or their 
enhanced ability to enjoy freedoms or exercise rights—but the social 
value of the interactions that occur under those conditions. 
2.  New Theories to Guide Design 
Individuals use Facebook and other social network sites and plat-
forms to support and strengthen existing relationships, and to a less-
er extent forge new ones, through interactions and information ex-
changes.  Theories that emphasize privacy’s role in building and 
sustaining relationships, delineating and defining the self in relation 
to others, and negotiating the interface between the self and others 
provide helpful explanations of the privacy fallout from News Feed.  
The theories above offer useful insights because they move away from 
the FIPPs model of users as the data subjects of corporate files.  They 
view privacy as a product of many inputs:  neither policy nor individ-
ual choice reigns supreme.  For this reason, they provide a useful lens 
through which to examine privacy issues between users that are par-
tially structured by the policy and technical constraints and affor-
dances of the platforms.  These theories ground privacy in a social 
context and conceive of privacy as a multi-dimensional, negotiated, 
process.  They hold privacy to protect society as well as the individu-
al—indeed, they ultimately reject constructs that pose them to be se-
verable, at least for the purpose of considering privacy. 
 
 84 See ALTMAN, supra  note 51, at 28 (identifying both input and output varieties of boundary 
control mechanisms). 
 85 Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 138–39. 
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a.  Re-Thinking Privacy by Design 
Ideally, these theories would provide insight into design require-
ments that could assist platform developers in avoiding future privacy 
gaffes.  Unfortunately, while the multi-dimensional, contextual, and 
fluid understandings of privacy they offer provide frameworks to un-
derstand the privacy problems facing users of social network sites and 
platforms, they do not provide straightforward answers as to which in-
formation flows, boundaries, or mechanisms are normatively desira-
ble at the outset.  Due to the contextually contingent understanding 
of privacy they propose, they cannot direct design without some addi-
tional work.  For what privacy means must be derived from the con-
text.  Though we have identified useful theories, the gap between 
theory and design remains formidable. 
For these theories to gain prescriptive power they must be 
coupled with design methods that elicit the contextually relevant 
needs and values.  Figuring out what flows and boundaries should be 
privileged in a given context requires inquiry into the values of the 
context and needs of the individuals within it.  If our assessment is 
correct and these theories of privacy should guide the design of social 
network sites and platforms, we must radically reconfigure the “priva-
cy toolbox.”86 
3.  Privacy as Human Process 
These theories of privacy concern themselves with privacy as a hu-
man-centered process.  As such, corporations seeking to attend to these 
conceptions of privacy must embrace design methods that are user-
centered rather than law-centered.  They must commit to processes 
of discovery rather than compliance.  Rather than adopting legal me-
chanisms to distance themselves from the question of what privacy 
requires, platform companies must identify methods and tools that 
will help them unearth and understand the privacy they ought to af-
ford.  Certainly values can and should be derived from law and other 
positive statements of normative commitment.  However, law is only 
one manifestation of what individuals value and require in a given 
context. 
Unfortunately current privacy by design tools based in FIPPs ma-
nifest as a legally-oriented process.  It is more aptly described as data pro-
tection by design, and takes privacy as commitment to a set of preor-
 
 86 See BENNETT, supra note 38, at 153–92 (examining an array of personal data protection 
policy choices). 
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dained principles.  As the European Commission states, it is a primar-
ily a tool of compliance, “[t]he principle of ‘Privacy by Design’ means 
that privacy and data protection are embedded throughout the entire 
life cycle of technologies, from the early design stage to their dep-
loyment, use and ultimate disposal.”87  The bulk of privacy by design 
tools and methodologies are aimed at corporate executives and pri-
vacy officers—many of whom are lawyers, not system architects, de-
signers, or coders.88  They help translate legal and policy require-
ments for the process of system or process design.  For example, 
requirements engineers seek to aid privacy compliance by developing 
frameworks and methodologies to extract privacy requirements from 
legal text.  Such tools are explicitly aimed at compliance.  They do 
not encourage conceptual or empirical inquiry into privacy needs, 
but rather seek to facilitate the process of compliance with a set of ex 
ante rules. 
Understanding privacy as a human process requires companies to 
solicit and understand the context-dependent privacy expectations of 
affected individuals.  This requires a conceptual and empirical in-
quiry into privacy’s meaning.  This form of privacy by design begins 
with value-centered and human-centered processes.  It requires a new 
set of privacy experts. 
Ensuring that a company accurately describes its privacy-related 
activities in its terms of service and provides appropriate mechanisms 
to capture consumer acceptance of them is a task for lawyers.  Under-
standing the values at play and privacy requirements in a given con-
text requires a separate set of skills.  It requires research to under-
stand and document what individuals bring to the table—their 
naïveté, their uninformed and ill-conceived notions of how technolo-
gy works, their mental models based in prior brick and mortar inte-
ractions, and their cognitive biases, to name a few.  It demands atten-
tiveness to context and human experience, the very attributes that 
 
 87 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:  A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection in the European Union, at 12 n.30, COM (2010) 609 final (Apr. 11, 2010), citing 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:  A Comprehensive Strategy on Data Protection in 
the European Union, COM (2007) 228. 
 88 See Seda Gürses, Carmela Troncoso & Claudia Diaz, Engineering Privacy by Design 2 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/
article-1542.pdf (“However, little past experience exists in designing systems with privacy 
in mind, and even those are typically invisible or inaccessible to policy makers who discuss 
the principles of privacy by design.”). 
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companies, through privacy notices, attempt to disavow and make ir-
relevant. 
Although rarely included in the privacy by design discussion oc-
curring at the regulatory level, the field of Human-Computer Interac-
tion (“HCI”) and the related and emerging field of Values Sensitive 
Design (“VSD”) are rife with approaches for identifying human needs 
and values in technical systems.  HCI researchers use a diverse set of 
methods to unearth users’ privacy expectations and concerns.  Based 
on such assessments researchers and designers select a theoretical 
framework to guide system design that aligns with a users’ concep-
tions of privacy issues.  Tellingly, one strand of HCI research ex-
amines privacy through the lens of “individual control”-based theo-
ries, while a second strand is motivated by Altman’s theory of privacy 
as boundary regulation.  VSD is a younger field, but shares some me-
thodological approaches and more importantly an affinity for contex-
tual inquiry to identify relevant values during design.  We examine 
relevant HCI research, and highlight some VSD approaches, to illu-
strate the methods and tools available to assist the developers of plat-
forms and social network sites in understanding and embedding so-
ciality theories of privacy.  Our goal is not to propose specific changes 
to News Feed or to social networking sites or platforms more broadly.  
Rather, our goal is to show the connection between the contextual 
understanding necessary for developers to address privacy issues and 
the methods and approaches of HCI and VSD. 
4.  Value Sensitive Design, Human-Computer Interaction, and Privacy By 
Design 
Privacy by design, as we re-envision it, should aim to identify con-
textually-bound understandings of privacy, and, to design system ar-
chitectures, interfaces, default settings as well as corporate policies 
that reflect them.  Thus understood, privacy by design fits under the 
broad umbrella of VSD, a “theoretically grounded approach to the 
design of technology that accounts for human values in a principled 
and comprehensive manner throughout the design process.”89  VSD 
research has focused on a broad set of values, including well being, 
dignity, justice, welfare, human rights, and privacy.90  VSD is some-
 
 89 BATYA FRIEDMAN ET AL., DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI. & ENG’G, UNIV. OF WASH., UW CSE 
TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 02-12-01, VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN:  THEORY AND METHODS 
(2001). 
 90 See VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN:  RESEARCH LAB, INFO. SCH. AND DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI. & 
ENG’G, UNIV. OF WASH., http://vsdesign.org/people.shtml (last updated June 30, 2011). 
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what distinct from HCI in that it “exhort[s] designers and producers 
to include values, purposively, in the set of criteria by which the ex-
cellence of technologies is judged”91 regardless of whether users of a 
system clamor for them. 
Scholars working on VSD are developing methodologies and tools 
to incorporate values into the design process.92  They began with val-
ues-based criticism of artifacts and systems, but have moved to devel-
op tools to put values into action during the design phase.93  The goal 
is to facilitate the development of technological artifacts and systems 
that support and respect the rich, divergent, and contextually-
dependent values of individuals and societies who depend on them. 
VSD has deep connections to the more mature field of HCI.  For 
over twenty years researchers in the field of HCI have uncovered pri-
vacy-specific issues in technological systems.  The methods used by 
HCI researchers draw from over forty years of work in the field, with 
roots in cognitive psychology, the social sciences, and human factors 
research.  None were developed to specifically identify privacy prob-
lems, yet they have proven effective at finding them.  Through these 
tools and methods, privacy issues emerged through open-ended in-
quiries into users’ concerns.  Drawing upon the toolbox of methods 
used by HCI researchers—surveys, focus groups, qualitative inter-
views, experiments, and case studies, to name a few—HCI has utilized 
the user’s perspective to successfully identify privacy problems across 
a broad spectrum of technologies.  Some of those findings have been 
 
 91 Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe, & Helen Nissenbaum, Embodying Values in Technology:  
Theory and Practice, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 322 (Jeroen 
van den Hoven & John Weckert eds. 2008). 
 92 For an early overview, see BATYA FRIEDMAN, VALUE-SENSITIVE DESIGN:  A RESEARCH 
AGENDA FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1999) (providing examples of initiatives that 
are intended to address social problems associated with the evolution of information 
technology).  For specific examples of frameworks for values in design analysis, see Flana-
gan, Howe, & Nissenbaum, supra note 90, at 322 (Jeroen van den Hoven & John Weckert 
eds. 2008) (explaining that values may be embodied in technical systems and devices); 
Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe, & Helen Nissenbaum, Values at Play:  Design Tradeoffs in 
Socially-Oriented Game Design, in CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 
751 (2005) (sketching a methodological framework for the consideration of values dur-
ing the process of design); FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 1 (offering an overarching ac-
count of value sensitivity design); Phoebe Sengers, Kirsten Boehner, Shay David & Joseph 
Kaye, Reflective Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH DECENNIAL ACM CONFERENCE ON 
CRITICAL COMPUTING 49 (2005), available at http://epl.scu.edu/~stsvalues/readings/refl
ectivedesign.pdf (developing a systematic approach to including critical reflection into 
the practice of technology design); L. Jean Camp, Design for Values, Design for Trust, L. 
JEAN CAMP (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.ljean.com/design.html. 
 93 Cory Knobel & Geoffrey C. Bowker, Computing Ethics Values in Design, 54 COMM. ACM 26, 
28 (2011) (emphasizing that the value in design efforts has been under way for fifteen 
years). 
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translated into design frameworks to suggest systematic ways of identi-
fying privacy issues, the original “privacy by design” approach.94 
HCI work starts with people rather than formal definitions of pri-
vacy.  Initially, privacy issues surfaced in examinations of the use of 
novel communication and collaboration tools.95  For example, in Bel-
lotti and Sellen’s 1993 paper offering some of the first explicit privacy 
design guidance, the authors passed on offering a precise definition 
of privacy, noting that “[a]ny realistic definition of privacy cannot be 
static . . . . We take privacy to be a personal notion shaped by cultural-
ly determined expectations and perceptions about one’s environ-
ment.”96  While HCI work continues to uncover privacy concerns 
through open-ended inquiries, over the past two decades, a growing 
body of privacy-focused HCI research has emerged to address the de-
velopment of ubiquitous computing technologies and internet ser-
vices such as social network sites.97 
There are two strains of privacy-focused HCI research.  Each cen-
ters on a distinct theory of privacy.  Like legal scholarship, many HCI 
inquiries are framed around theories of privacy based on individual 
control over personal information.  This branch is rooted in the in-
formation self-determination approach affiliated with Alan Westin 
and data protection.  The second branch of HCI inquiry is theoreti-
cally oriented around the interpersonal, boundary-driven work of 
psychologist Irwin Altman (and by implication, sociologist Erving 
Goffman).98 
These two orientations have led to research with two distinct foci.  
The first, grounded in privacy as control, “emphasizes privacy as con-
scious process.”  The second, grounded in privacy’s role in develop-
 
 94 See generally DONALD NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS (1988) (providing a de-
tailed discussion and examples of privacy frameworks, which they classify as guidelines, 
process frameworks, and modeling frameworks). 
 95 Giovanni Iachello & Jason Hong, End-User Privacy in Human-Computer Interaction, 1 FOUND. 
& TRENDS IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 17 (2007) (explaining that human-
computer interaction research initially focused on the use of information technology to 
enable interpersonal communications). 
 96 Victoria Bellotti & Abigail Sellen, Designing for Privacy in Ubiquitous Computing Environ-
ments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER-SUPPORTED 
COOPERATIVE WORK 77, 78 (G. De Michelis et al., eds. 1993). 
 97 Others have proposed specific changes to Facebook’s architecture grounded in HCI re-
search.  See, e.g., Chris Peterson, Losing Face:  An Environmental Analysis of Privacy on 
Facebook 30 (Jan. 2010) (unpublished comment), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=cpeterson).  Our 
task here is not to suggest particular changes based on existing research, but to suggest 
that HCI methods are a tool for identifying and driving privacy issues during design. 
 98 ALTMAN, supra note 51; ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
(1959). 
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ing the self and community, grounded in the work of Irwin Altman, 
emphasizes privacy as “intuitive practice.”99  The two approaches are 
complementary100 and complement different areas of privacy re-
search:  examinations of notice and consent, privacy policies, ubi-
quitous computing technologies, and general usage of social net-
works or location sharing services typically are situated in the 
paradigm of individual control, while studies exploring more socially 
situated actions, such as personal disclosure on social networks or lo-
cation-sharing services, are often based in boundary management.  
The dual approaches have “produced a wealth of tools, including 
analytic instruments, design guidelines, legislation, and social expec-
tations.”  It has not yet led to agreement upon what tools work best.101  
Given the deep commitment to contextual solutions, it is somewhat 
doubtful that a set tool kit will emerge. 
While a diverse set of methods are used to identify privacy issues—
primarily observational studies, controlled experiments, surveys, case 
studies, focus groups, and qualitative interviews—the commonality 
that emerges across them is a focus on users.  Users’ goals and needs 
are central to all stages of the design process.102  It is this objective of 
centering the analysis (both the problem specification and the solu-
tion) on users, rather than on a normative framework, that differen-
tiates HCI-based privacy research from legal scholarship.  User-
centered design approaches have been used to explore privacy in a 
diverse set of contexts including peer-to-peer file sharing systems,103 
mobile and online photo sharing,104 privacy settings on social net-
 
 99 Paul Dourish & Ken Anderson, Collective Information Practice:  Exploring Privacy and Security 
as Social and Cultural Phenomena, 21 HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION 319, 328 (2006), 
available at http://www.douri.sh/publications/2006/DourishAnderson-InfoPractices-
HCIJ.pdf; Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World, in 5 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 129 
(2003). 
100 Scott Lederer et al., Personal Privacy Through Understanding and Action:  Five Pitfalls for De-
signers, 8 PERS. UBIQUIT. COMPUTING 440, 442 (2004). 
101 Iachello & Hong, supra note 95, at 13. 
102 NORMAN, supra note 94. 
103 See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Good & Aaron Krekelberg, Usability and Privacy:  A Study of KaZaA 
P2P File-Sharing, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 137 (2003) (detailing how peer-to-peer network users unwittingly 
share private files). 
104 See, e.g., Shane Ahern et al., Over-Exposed?  Privacy Patterns and Considerations in Online and 
Mobile Photo Sharing in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 357 (2007) (focusing on how users share photos over social net-
works). 
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works,105 information flow in RFID-enabled documents,106 and user 
comprehension of legal notice and consent in software systems.107  
This context-specific approach creates detailed portraits of privacy is-
sues across a variety of domains.  The research outputs range from 
rich qualitative inquiries108 to broad nationally representative opinion 
samples.109 
HCI research places the user at the center of the inquiry, though 
the outcome of HCI research aims to represent as many germane 
perspectives as possible (and not simply a single “user”) in order to 
generate a privacy model that reflects actual experiences and norms 
related to privacy regardless of theoretical grounding.  A central as-
pect to this process is that, when done well, it is both iterative and 
empirical; researchers begin with a theory or framework that they 
think best captures the relationship between users and their potential 
privacy concerns and can refine it as appropriate after subjecting it to 
testing and analysis.  An iterative approach can identify potential pri-
vacy mismatches between researchers and users and avoids a top-
down imposition of the research organization’s values on the users.  
Once the privacy relationship between the users, operators, and the 
technology is empirically modeled, then researchers can work directly 
with project managers and engineers to ensure it is reflected in both 
the system architecture and the processes for using the system. 
 
105 See, e.g., Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now?  Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online 
Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. OF SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 20 (2008) (finding little connection 
between the desired privacy level of users and those users’ actual privacy settings on social 
networks). 
106 See, e.g., Jennifer King & Aylin Selcukoglu, Where’s the Beep?  A Case Study of User Misunders-
tandings of RFID in 2011 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RFID 192–99 (Apr. 2011) 
(exploring implementation of radio frequency identification technology in credit cards, 
passports, and transit passes affects user privacy concerns). 
107 Nathaniel S. Good, Jens Grossklags, Deirdre K. Mulligan, & Joseph A. Konstan, Noticing 
Notice:  A Large-Scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License Agreements, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 607, 615 
(2007); Jens Grossklags & Nathan Good, Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy 
Makers and Usability Designers, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 341–55 
(Sven Dietrich and Rachna Dhamija eds., 2007). 
108 Michelle Kwasny, Kelly Caine, Wendy A. Rogers & Arthur D. Fisk, Privacy and Technology:  
Folk Definitions and Perspectives, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3291–96 (2008); Judith S. Olson, Jonathan Grudin & Er-
ic Horvitz, Toward Understanding Preferences for Sharing and Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1985–88 (2005). 
109 Chris Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li, & Joseph Turow, How Different Are Young Adults 
from Older Adults When It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 3 (U.C. Berkeley 
Ctr. for Law and Tech., Working Paper, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864. 
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Unearthing users’ expectations ensures that the theoretical 
framework chosen to guide system design captures users’ conceptions 
of privacy.  For example, had Facebook used contextual integrity 
theory to analyze News Feed’s previously existing norms of informa-
tion flow, their designers might have anticipated many of their users’ 
complaints and designed the changes with these norms in mind, al-
lowing those who wished to broadcast their Feed far and wide to do 
so while respecting the concerns of others.  Nissenbaum, from the 
VSD perspective, would have contextually grounded the review of sta-
tus updates.  While Facebook is somewhat sui generis, its purpose is 
to promote social interaction among friends.  Thus the proper ques-
tion to ask would be what sorts of information flows are necessary to 
support friendship.  Such an inquiry would have invited reflection on 
the differences between the vernacular category friend and the Face-
book category Friend.  It may have revealed some tension between 
broad friending which is beneficial to both Facebook and users and 
dissemination models that eliminate the transaction costs that sorted 
vernacular friends from Facebook friends.  Two HCI-specific methods 
could have surfaced this potential problem:  a study examining users’ 
motivations for using the (Mini) Feed and their expected audience 
and testing of the proposed changes with a broad population of us-
ers.  While the eventual result might have in fact been the News Feed 
as we know it in 2011—a push mechanism but with the ability to se-
lect among friends on both the sending and receiving ends—a deli-
berative approach centered on user needs and values could have 
saved the company from months of backlash by proactively identify-
ing concerns and incorporating features similar to those they later re-
trofitted.  A complementary argument can be made with respect to 
boundary regulation; if Facebook had been interested in exploring 
whether their existing architecture supported the lines users drew (or 
wanted to draw) between their public profiles and their respective 
audiences, they could have conducted a qualitative study to identify 
how and why their user population utilized profile privacy settings.  
Had the company subjected its privacy settings to an analysis within 
this framework prior to making their much-derided architectural 
changes in December 2009,110 when the profile defaults were changed 
to expose more information, the company might have realized then 
that the site’s network structure was insufficient for supporting com-
 
110 Zuckerberg, supra note 26 (describing the company’s 2009 “simplification,” after which 
user information was available to “friends, friends of . . . friends, or everyone,” rather than 
only within certain networks). 
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plex boundary management.  This case was not one of accident but 
of deliberate choice on the part of founder Mark Zuckerberg, who 
has stated that having more than one identity—“a different image for 
your work friends or co-workers and for the other people that you 
know”—demonstrates “a lack of integrity.”111  Zuckerberg attempted 
to prioritize his values in the site design.  His values apparently con-
flicted with those of many Facebook users.  If Facebook had unders-
tood that Zuckerberg’s opinion on this issue was not universal, they 
might have avoided user protests and post-launch modifications.  
Perhaps they would have worked with a privacy model that supported 
more granular options for sharing profile data and facilitated the 
maintenance of multiple identities.112 
The theories we have identified as useful for understanding lateral 
privacy concerns in SNSs and platforms, due to their deeply contex-
tual and human-centered orientation, require processes of discovery, 
not just implementation.  HCI and VSD provide uniquely helpful me-
thods to aid in the discovery process as well as implementation.  Con-
textual integrity, for example, calls attention to existing norms and 
information flows.  At a minimum, researchers employing this 
framework should appreciate the “radical heterogeneity”113 of online 
experience and its interconnection to offline experiences, and there-
fore view efforts to export rules across contexts skeptically.  Research-
ers should explore and document users’ extant privacy definitions 
and expectations and test whether proposed architectures and de-
signs support or violate these definitions.  To the extent that the sys-
tem under inquiry involves social interactions, researchers and de-
signers should pay special attention to the social relationships their 
system enables, and whether users have the tools necessary to main-
tain the boundaries that regulate their sense of privacy in accordance 
with their expectations. 
While HCI has a track record of success in identifying privacy 
concerns, it lacks a cohesive, prescriptive method to guide subse-
quent inquiries.  This is partially because privacy research in HCI is in 
 
111 Kim-Mai Cutler, Why Mark Zuckerberg Needs to Come Clean About His Views on Privacy, 
VENTUREBEAT (May 13, 2010), http://venturebeat.com/2010/05/13/zuckerberg-
privacy/ (quoting DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 199 (2010)). 
112 See also Mark Zuckerberg, Making Control Simple, The FACEBOOK BLOG (May 26, 2010, 1:55 
PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=391922327130 (explaining the changes 
to Facebook’s privacy settings intended to make Facebook privacy simpler to control). 
113 See Nissenbaum, supra note 81, at 37, 41 (“As long as public discourse about privacy on-
line takes the marketplace and commerce as proxies for the whole, conceptions of privacy 
will be inadequate.  We need to take full account of the radical heterogeneity of online 
activity and practice.”). 
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its early adolescence.  Iachello and Hong characterize the state of the 
field as “unorganized and dispersed” and suggest that “understanding 
privacy requires HCI practitioners to expand their field of view from 
traditional HCI domains such as social psychology and cognitive 
science, to a broader picture which includes economics and law.”114  
However, even when mature, the context-dependent nature of HCI 
privacy inquiry suggests that it will never be tightly prescriptive.  HCI 
privacy inquiry is not amenable to off-the-shelf decisional tools or pa-
per processes.  The HCI professional’s value is in part the judgment 
to ascertain what method is appropriate for a given situation. 
V.  NEW REGULATORY DIRECTIONS 
We have argued that corporations should embrace definitions of 
privacy that are contextual and contingent, and adopt HCI and re-
lated VSD methodologies to construct these definitions and drive 
their implementation in design.  These tools are appropriate because 
they seek to discover privacy, rather than dictate or assume it. 
The steady stream of privacy blunders stemming from a lack of at-
tention or actual disregard for users’ privacy expectations suggest that 
companies have not adopted HCI-focused approaches, or, if they 
have, that that HCI input has been devalued.  Given that Facebook, 
Google, Apple, Microsoft, Twitter, and other companies employ sig-
nificant numbers of HCI researchers, it is likely that such privacy fail-
ures can be attributed to both lack of adoption of HCI methods and 
disregard for HCI-based insight when in tension with other business 
goals. 
The release of Google Buzz offers a glimpse into one privacy inci-
dent that might have been avoided if an HCI-grounded inquiry had 
been used to understand the privacy expectations of users and inform 
design.  Google typically offers beta releases of its products and uses 
feedback during this period to work out glitches, including privacy 
glitches.  Unlike other products that reportedly are tested by a group 
of family and friends as well as employees, Buzz skipped this limited 
external testing.115  Instead, it underwent only internal employee test-
ing known colloquially as “dogfooding.”116  This process failed to 
 
114 Iachello & Hong, supra note 95, at 114–15. 
115 Jonathan Fildes, Google Admits Buzz Social Network Testing Flaws, BBC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8517613.stm. 
116 See generally Warren Harrison, Eating Your Own Dog Food, IEEE SOFTWARE, May & June 
2006, at 5–7 (“[T]he software industry has adopted the phrase to mean that a company 
uses its own products.”). 
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identify the privacy problems that the public noted upon launch.117  
After Buzz launched, a former Google designer who worked on the 
product released a widely viewed presentation on the future of social 
networks, which indirectly critiqued many of the privacy problems 
raised by Buzz.118  Thus, even Google, an engineering organization 
employing hundreds of user experience researchers, was apparently 
deaf to their recommendations, resulting in a flurry of privacy blund-
ers,119 a class-action lawsuit, and ultimately a settlement with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (“FTC”).120  Ironically, the designer subse-
quently left the company for Facebook, noting that “Google is an 
engineering company, and as a researcher or designer, it’s very diffi-
cult to have your voice heard at a strategic level . . . . Google values 
technology, not social science.”121  Companies may run roughshod 
 
117 See Fildes, supra note 112 (describing the series of changes made to Google Buzz after 
consumer backlash concerning the privacy settings).  HCI researchers identify several 
reasons dogfooding is an insufficient replacement for user testing.  First, it is difficult for 
employees to step out of evaluator mode—a mode of rational, reflective process—and in-
to user mode—dominated by a subjective relation to objects, an experiential mode.  See 
Elizabeth F. Churchill, The (Anti)Social Net, INTERACTIONS, Sept. & Oct. 2010, at 23, availa-
ble at http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1836216.1836222 (“Geeks, computer scientists, and 
mathematicians who love networks are not good people to assess your social-networking 
products . . . because we operate simultaneously in user and evaluator mode . . . .”).  
Second, employees at technology companies tend to be expert users, while the popula-
tion as a whole is not.  Generalizing based on test results from the expert population is 
dangerous.  It is true that even expert users misunderstand the privacy implications of set-
tings.  See MICHELLE MADEJSKI, MARITZA JOHNSON, & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN,  COLUMBIA 
UNIV. COMPUTER SCI., TECHNICAL REPORT NO. CUCS-010-11, THE FAILURE OF ONLINE 
SOCIAL NETWORK PRIVACY SETTINGS 7–11 (2011), available at 
https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1459 (showing that 
even their study’s sample pool, college students who are expert Facebook users, did not 
understand how to protect their privacy).  Non-experts, however, have a greater tendency 
to engage in over-sharing that results in problematic “misclosures.”  Kwasny, supra note 
105, at 2393.  In addition, many employees of social network sites are enthralled with 
networks qua networks:  they are not “people” persons. 
118 See Paul Adams, The Real Life Social Network, (Jul. 1 2010), 
http://www.slideshare.net/padday/the-real-life-social-network-v2 (cautioning companies 
that failing to safeguard private information will lead to a decrease in consumer trust and 
criticizing companies for difficult to understand privacy settings). 
119 Alma Whitten, An Update on Buzz, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011, 7:30 AM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/update-on-buzz.html (admitting that Google 
Buzz fell short of standards for transparency and user control). 
120 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in 
Google’s Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm (“Google Inc. has agreed to settle Federal 
Trade Commission charges that it used deceptive tactics and violated its own privacy 
promises to consumers when it launched its social network, Google Buzz, in 2010.”). 
121 Paul Adams, Why I Left Google.  What Happened to My Book.  What I Work on at Facebook, 
THINK OUTSIDE IN (July 12, 2011), http://www.thinkoutsidein.com/blog/2011/07/why-i-
left-google-what-happened-to-my-book-what-i-work-on-at-facebook/. 
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over decisions that protect users privacy when they are in tension with 
other factors. 
A key question is therefore what might regulators do to prompt 
the adoption of HCI and VSD methodologies to identify and respond 
to privacy issues in the design of SNSs and platforms.  Two conditions 
set out in recent FTC settlements could, if appropriately fueled, drive 
corporate privacy activities in this direction. 
First, the two recent settlements require companies to establish a 
comprehensive privacy program (“CPP”).  Per the agreements, a CPP 
must include specific processes aimed at identifying “reasonably fore-
seeable, material [privacy] risks”122 in “product design, [and] devel-
opment”123 and to design, implement, and iteratively monitor, test, 
and improve “reasonable privacy controls and procedures.”124  The ac-
tivities called for under the “comprehensive privacy program” appear 
uniquely aligned with HCI approaches. 
Second, the decision in a separate settlement to constrain the ac-
ceptance of pro forma disclosures of deviant information flows is dis-
positive of the fairness of a surveillance practice.  The FTC rejected a 
company’s effort to egregiously violate users’ privacy by engaging in 
widespread monitoring of all their online activities based on a buried 
disclosure in their terms of service—despite the fact that the compa-
ny’s notice was detailed and alarming.125  The implication of the order 
is that companies have an obligation to attend to consumers’ under-
standings of the normal rules of engagement during online interac-
tions and that if they want to deviate and capture novel information 
they must “clearly and prominently disclose” and gain consent 
through a mechanism other than the End-User License Agreement 
(“EULA”), Privacy Policy, or Terms of Service (“TOS”).126  By limiting 
the ability of companies to unilaterally define consumers’ expecta-
tions, the FTC is shifting away from a contract-based regime toward a 
more tort-based regime focused on fairness—an approach imminent-
 
122 Agreement Containing Consent Order at § III, para. B, In re Google Inc., No. 102-3136 
(F.T.C. 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/
110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf [hereinafter Google Order]. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at § III, para. C. 
125 In re Sears Holding Mgmt. Corp., Docket No. C-4264 (issued Aug. 31, 2009) (complaint), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/090604searscmpt.pdf. 
126 Sears Order § I.  The order in the Google case contains a similar provision requiring sep-
arate notice and consent procedures for disclosures of a Google user’s information.  
Google Order, supra note 124, at § II. 
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ly consistent with the FTC’s enabling statute and in line with a series 
of settlements in security cases based on allegations of unfairness.127 
Corporate lawyers have complained that the shift from an analysis 
of the adequacy of notices to an assessment of the milieu in which the 
interaction occurs provides inadequate guidance to companies and 
invites endless Monday morning quarterbacking by the FTC and ad-
vocates.128  There is some truth to this; however an alternative out-
come could be greater corporate reliance on HCI professionals to 
understand users’ expectations and ensure that deviations are justifi-
able and clearly spelled out. 
Taken together, these settlements set the stage for HCI-based ap-
proaches.  However, they will not take root on their own.  While there 
is some evidence that at least a subset of corporations were using a 
contextually-driven, consumer expectations-oriented definition of 
privacy to inform corporate privacy activities, and that this approach 
emerged in part due to the activities of the FTC,129 the requirements 
of these orders set the stage for more attention to consumer expecta-
tions.  With these recent actions the FTC posits that privacy is not ex-
clusively the product of a contractual agreement.  Implicitly, this 
precludes using a single or consistent notice—or approach—across a 
range of services or practices, because doing so fails to acknowledge 
privacy’s contextual tether.  The clauses strongly suggest that corpo-
 
127 In a series of actions, the Commission has brought unfairness claims against companies 
for breaches of data security despite the fact that they had not made representations re-
garding data security. See, e.g., In re Vision I Props., L.L.C., 139 F.T.C. 296 (2005) (alleging 
unfairness rather than deception); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465 (2005) 
(alleging unfairness where no statements were made about security); see also Andrew B. 
Serwin, The FTC’s Increased Focus on Protecting Personal Information:  An Overview of Enforce-
ment and Guidance (Nov. 22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305669 (dis-
cussing the impact of FTC actions on the data security obligations of corporations). 
128 See, e.g., Alan Charles Raul et al., End of the Notice Paradigm?:  FTC’s Proposed Sears Settlement 
Casts Doubt On the Sufficiency of Disclosures in Privacy Policies and User Agreements, 8 PRIVACY & 
SEC. L. REP. 1070, 1070–71 (2009) (“Heretofore, the FTC had emphasized that it was not 
engaged in a game of ‘Gotcha’ with online business.  The Sears settlement, on the other 
hand, could easily have caught the respondent company by surprise—especially since 
Sears was unquestionably providing something of value to the participating consumers in 
exchange for their reduced privacy (i.e., paying them cash) . . . If this decision is finalized 
in its current form, and if the Commissioners indicate that the erstwhile notice paradigm 
is legally insufficient to protect consumers, then the FTC should publish clear rules for 
how they expect companies to communicate online with their consumers.”); see also Mi-
chael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine and Data Security Breach Litigation:  Has the 
Commission Gone Too Far? (Aug. 20, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012232 
(discussing and criticizing the FTC’s data security cases under the unfairness doctrine on 
a similar basis). 
129 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011). 
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rations should pay greater attention to their customers’ intuitive un-
derstanding of the data flows in the technical environment.  The con-
tours of the “comprehensive privacy program” set out in the Google 
Order clearly require activities to understand privacy from the users’ 
perspective.  Designing, implementing, testing, and monitoring “rea-
sonable privacy controls and procedures” requires interaction with 
users.  Surely some relevant users of privacy controls will be inside the 
company; however, just as surely some privacy controls will be pro-
vided to consumers themselves and assessing the reasonableness of 
such controls, monitoring them, and testing them all require interac-
tions with users.  The Google Buzz consent decree seemingly indi-
cates that the FTC will be pushing firms to develop processes that 
embed privacy into corporate practice and technical design.130 
Taken together these settlements could begin to steer the law to-
ward HCI inquiry.  Understanding privacy protection as a process of 
iterative assessment of privacy risks and responsive design may drive 
corporations to embrace HCI methods and tools.  However, given the 
predominance of lawyers and notice and consent-based privacy ap-
proaches, greater direction and encouragement will likely be re-
quired to drive their adoption. 
In the absence of new legal authority, the FTC could choose 
among several options for advancing the use of HCI methods by 
firms.  The FTC has begun to issue guidance in the wake of the 
Google Buzz settlement by urging companies to “bake privacy in” and 
“consider it from the get go.”131  Through workshops and reports it 
could provide important exposure to HCI research methods. 
In the past, the FTC has devoted substantial effort to support the 
production of a shared knowledge base, the exchange of ideas be-
tween practitioners and researchers, and the sharing of best practices 
on significant consumer protection issues, including privacy.  For ex-
ample, the issues of “online profiling” and “behavioral advertising” 
have been the subject of numerous FTC workshops over the past dec-
ade.132  To assist the business community in implementing legally 
 
130 Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in 
Google’s Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm. 
131 Lesley Fair, The FTC’s Settlement with Google:  Part 4, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS CTR. (Apr. 14, 2011, 5:53 PM), 
http://business.ftc.gov/blog/2011/04/ftcs-settlement-google-part-4. 
132 See, e.g., FTC Workshop, Monitoring Software on Your PC:  Spyware, Adware, and Other 
Software (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
spyware/index.shtm; FTC Workshop, The Information Marketplace:  Merging and Ex-
changing Consumer Data (Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
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mandated financial privacy notices, the FTC cooperated with the 
other eight regulatory agencies responsible for implementation of 
the privacy provisions of the Gram Leach Bliley Act to host a work-
shop on effective notices.133  The workshop brought the expertise of 
academic and professional experts in the communication field to the 
attention of regulated entities for the purpose of providing guidance 
and methods for effective notices.134  Similar public workshops were 
held to examine “negative options.”135  Again, academic and profes-
sional experts were brought in to discuss the issues.  Ultimately a staff 
report based on the FTC’s law enforcement actions and the workshop 
was issued setting out principles for avoiding deception in negative 
options.136  The FTC could pursue a similar path with privacy issues in 
social network sites and platforms.  The privacy by design require-
ment found in the recent preliminary FTC staff report on “Protecting 
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change”137 can be viewed as an 
early step in this direction.  Follow-up workshops that explore the use 
of HCI techniques could be quite beneficial to platform and social 
network site developers who will find incomplete guidance, at best, in 
existing privacy by design approaches.  Convening experts from the 
fields of VSD and HCI to discuss their approaches could begin to 
generate industry interest in a more robust privacy by design toolbox. 
 
workshops/infomktplace/index.shtml; FTC Town Hall, Ehavioral Advertising:  Tracking, 
Targeting & Technology (Nov. 1–2, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
workshops/ehavioral/index.shtml. 
133 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Interagency Public Workshop:  Get No-
ticed:  Effective Financial Privacy Notices, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 4, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/glb/index.shtml (describing a workshop educating 
individuals about changes in privacy rules after the GLB Act). 
134 See Agenda, Interagency Public Workshop:  Get Noticed:  Effective Financial Privacy No-
tices, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
workshops/glb/agenda.htm (explaining that the aim of one panel was to “provide guid-
ance in communicating complex information to consumers. . . [and] discuss various tools 
that may assist financial institutions in crafting understandable privacy notices” with pa-
nelists including Deborah S. Bosley, Ph.D., Director of the University Writing Programs at 
the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Mark Hochhauser, Ph.D., Readability Con-
sultant, and Alan Levy, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Consumer Studies Team, Center for Food 
Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration). 
135 FED. TRADE COMM’N, NEGATIVE OPTIONS:  A REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE FTC DIVISION 
OF ENFORCEMENT i–ii, iv (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P064202negativeoptionreport.pdf 
136 See id. at i. (“On January 25, 2007, the Federal Trade Commission hosted a workshop that 
brought together industry representatives, consumer groups, and members of the aca-
demic community to discuss negative option marketing.”). 
137 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:  A 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
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The FTC could raise the pressure and attempt to use its soft law 
powers to encourage companies in the platform and social network 
site businesses to establish a set of self-regulatory guidelines on how 
to use HCI in their privacy work.  Ideally, such guidelines would re-
quire companies to use HCI methods to identify and address privacy 
issues.  The development of the Network Advertising Initiative guide-
lines138 provides an example of a self-regulatory code that developed 
in response to ongoing scrutiny by the FTC.139  Given the relentless 
barrage of privacy complaints and increasing regulatory scrutiny 
companies such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, and Twitter 
are facing, they may find it useful to collaborate on a process-oriented 
set of guidelines for considering privacy issues.  Such agreement 
might be quite advantageous in navigating the regulatory chaos.  By 
agreeing on process-based guidelines they would retain ample room 
to make distinct choices about the design, defaults, and policies they 
put in place.  The value of adherence to a self-regulatory code for a 
business varies greatly depending upon the extent to which it disrupts 
business practices, its strength, public perception of its legitimacy, 
and the willingness of relevant regulators to endorse it.  In an area of 
emerging regulatory requirements, self-regulatory codes offer indus-
try an opportunity to proactively shape the legal landscape.  Given 
that privacy is ambiguous, and likely to remain that way, and that 
regulators are rolling out new requirements to address it during all 
phases of business and product development but have not yet clari-
fied exactly what is expected, the timing of an effort to clarify what 
 
138 NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE PREFERENCE 
MARKETING BY NETWORK ADVERTISERS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2000/07/NAI%207-10%20Final.pdf (guiding business practices with respect to online 
advertisement). 
139 An FTC workshop, and media and advocate scrutiny, led to the adoption of an initial set 
of guidelines by ten companies:  24/7 Media; AdForce; AdKnowledge; Adsmart; Doub-
leClick; Engage; Flycast; MatchLogic; NetGravity; and Real Media.  See Comments of the 
Network Advertising Initiative, Testimony at the Public Workshop on Online Profiling, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Nov. 8, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/profiling/comments/
nai.htm (describing the Network’s motivation for drafting the guidelines).  In the wake of 
ongoing FTC focus, including complaints and investigations, a broader group of compa-
nies adopted a revised set of principles.  For the most recent NAI Code, see NETWORK 
ADVER. INITIATIVE, 2008 NAI PRINCIPLES:  THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE’S SELF-
REGULATORY CODE OF CONDUCT (2008), available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/
networks/2008%20NAI%20Principles_final%20for%20Website.pdf.  For a discussion of 
the FTC workshop and overview of the FTC’s early activities, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ONLINE PROFILING:  A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2
000/06/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf.  For an update on recent FTC activities, see 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 
(2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf. 
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sort of design processes are appropriate to address privacy may be 
ripe and beneficial. 
The stage is set for HCI and VSD research and design to take its 
place in the regulatory landscape.  The FTC would do well to use its 
convening skills to begin to solidify the relationship between its direc-
tion to companies and this emerging field. 
CONCLUSION 
[A]general principle is that we should attempt to design responsive envi-
ronments, which permit easy alternation between a state of separateness 
and a state of togetherness.  If privacy has a shifting dialectic quality, 
then, ideally, we should offer people environments that can be respon-
sive to their shifting desires for contact or absence of contact with oth-
ers . . . . The logic of our framework calls for more use of changeable en-
vironments so as to permit a greater responsiveness to changing needs 
for privacy.140 
Irwin Altman’s words endure.  The plasticity of SNSs and platforms 
that support a growing percentage of human interaction makes them 
arguably more relevant and more pressing.  Society wants privacy ex-
pectations reflected in the information flows afforded by these built 
environments.  Yet the absence of a sound theoretical framework is 
problematic for corporations that lack guidance and find their deci-
sions subjected to heavy hindsight criticism.  It prevents privacy pro-
fessionals within firms from systematizing approaches across the firm.  
It is equally problematic for regulators whose actions can be por-
trayed as unjustified and unsupported.141 
Privacy by design is an exceedingly important regulatory initiative.  
Artifacts matter and ought to assist in protecting social values includ-
ing privacy.  However, building the right “privacy” into design is criti-
cal, and today regulators are working with an extremely cramped de-
finition of privacy.  Individual control may be the touchstone of data 
protection, but it is not the touchstone of privacy protection. 
It is time to think of the internet as more than the latest market-
ing database.  It is the public square, the private living room, the café, 
and the schoolyard.  Privacy must relate to the varied nature of these 
environments and the activities that occur within them.  Privacy is 
 
140 ALTMAN, supra note 36, at 207–08. 
141 See, e.g., Alan Charles Raul et al., End of the Notice Paradigm?:  FTC’s Proposed Sears Settlement 
Casts Doubt On the Sufficiency of Disclosures in Privacy Policies and User Agreements, 8 PRIVACY & 
SEC. L. REP. 1070, 1070 (2009) (criticizing an FTC settlement with a national retailer re-
garding its failure to adequately disclose the scope of consumer personal information be-
ing collected by marketing research software). 
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contextual and fluid.  It is individual and social.  It is justified, chal-
lenged, and negotiated. 
Privacy so-defined requires processes of discovery to precede de-
sign.  HCI and VSD offer tools for unearthing relevant conceptions of 
privacy.  Corporations need a reason to adopt them.  Recent activity 
at the FTC provides an opening to connect the HCI and VSD com-
munity of researchers and practitioners to the regulatory endeavor.  
The FTC has an opportunity to facilitate the development of a new 
set of privacy professionals within firms:  HCI and VSD researchers 
and designers.  Doing so would breathe life into the call for privacy 
by design, animating privacy, and emboldening design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
